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ANOTHER LOOK AT LOUISIANA SUCCESSION LAW: THE
RAMIFICATIONS OF Succession of Brown
As a result of the recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision in
Succession of Brown1 which held article 9192 of the Civil Code uncon-
stitutional, the disparate treatment accorded persons deemed ille-
gitimate under Louisiana succession law must be reformed in some sig-
nificant manner.' The inferior rights granted illegitimates include
provisions governing the illegitimate's place in the estate of his
parents, and in the estates of legitimate relations of the parents.
Also of concern in this area are provisions relating to the rights of
others in the estate of the illegitimate. The instant comment will
discuss the probable or potential effect which Brown may have upon
these areas of succession law,' as well as its potential influence on
other legitimate relations with regard to the rights of the illegiti-
mate child. Changes are suggested which may be necessary to remove
any constitutional deficiencies that exist in the successions scheme.
Other desirable changes are noted-changes not constitutionally re-
quired, but nevertheless desirable if certain code mechanisms are to
continue to operate properly in light of the Brown decision.'
Although the extent of reform is speculative, the constitutional
overtones of Brown suffice to sound the alarm that, in many situa-
tions, the rights of the illegitimate in the law regulating successions
must be no less than the rights of children of legitimate status.
Louisiana Framework
Legitimacy distinctions in the context of successions law may be
traced to forces at work in the sources of the Louisiana Civil Code.
1. 388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980).
2. LA. CIV. CODE art. 919 provides: "Illegitimate children are called to the inheri-
tance of their father, who has duly acknowledged them, when he has left no descen-
dants nor ascendants, nor collateral relations, nor suryiving wife, and to the exclusion
only of the state."
3. This comment treats primarily the subject of intestate successions, which was
the focus of Brown. The Brown decision also affects certain provisions concerning
testate successions; these effects are noted also.
4. Brown may have a broader effect than to revise succession law. For example,
articles 216 through 244 of the Civil Code, dealing with paternal authority and the
duties of parents toward their children (legitimate and illegitimate) and of the recipro-
cal duties owed the parents by their children, may have to be reconsidered. Article
256, dealing with tutorship of the illegitimate child, also should be reexamined.
5. See text at notes 114-19, infra.
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Louisiana law is a pastiche of Spanish and French notions,' which
the redactors intertwined to create our present codal authority.
Historically, the principal concept involved in the formulation of the
legitimate/illegitimate dichotomy was the protection and encourage-
ment of the family unit.7 Strong notions were visible in the law of
Rome-the concept of familia, for example, of basic importance in
Roman law, has evolved to become "predominant as [an element] of
social order in the Louisiana Code . . . ."' The illegitimate did not fit
logically within the familia concept in Rome and was therefore
excluded from the family unit. In the development of French and
Spanish law, however, the moral aspects of illegitimacy began to
militate against the illegitimate, and the preservation of "family
values" became the primary focus of legitimacy distinctions.' Domat
articulated the reasoning: "Marriage being the only lawful way
appointed for the propagation of mankind, it is but just to distin-
guish the condition of bastards from that of children lawfully begot-
ten. And it is because of this distinction that the laws declare
bastards incapable of succeeding to persons who die intestate . . . 0
The civilian notion also prevailed that if the state were to force a
family to share its patrimony with an illegitimate, the disintegration
of the family as an efficient economic unit could result." Thus legal,
moral, and economic factors were all present in the history of legi-
timacy considerations.
Regarding the law of intestate successions as now provided in
the Louisiana Civil Code, one should be concerned primarily with
the inheritance rights granted illegitimate persons under these arti-
cles, as opposed to the rights accorded legitimates. The Civil Code
6. "It has been stated by eminent authority that Moreau Lislet and James
Brown followed the first projet of the Code Napoleon in preparing the code of 1808."
Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Law, 6 TUL. L. REV. 280, 283 (1932).
"It has elsewhere been stated that the Code Commissioners ... incorporated as
well a part of the Spanish law that had become a rule of property in Louisiana." Id.
Although the Code Napoleon may have served as a model for the Code of 1808, "Isluf-
fice it to say here, that there are many differences between the Code Napoleon and
the Louisiana Code of 1808 due to the incorporation of the Spanish law ..." Id.
7. This notion hails from Roman law, which weighed heavily on the formulation
of both French and Spanish law. Tucker, Souces of Louisiana's Law of Persons:
Blackstone, Domat, and the French Codes, 44 TUL. L. REV. 264, 266 (1970).
8. Id.
9. See Note, All in the Family: Equal Protection and the Illegitimate Child in
Louisiana Succession Law, 38 LA. L. REV. 189 (1977).
10, 1 J. DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER 137 n.e. (Cushing ed. 1853).
11. Pascal, Lousiana Succession and Related Laws and the Illegitimate:
Thoughts Prompted by Labine v. Vincent, 46 TUL. L. REV. 167, 177 (1971). Professor
Pascal notes that the scheme of discrimination, although not proper in our time and
under our social conditions, may have been proper in 1808 and 1825. Id.
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places fundamental importance upon the classification of offspring as
"legitimate"'2 or "illegitimate."'3 Although illegitimate children do
not have the same legal rights as legitimate children, certain rights
do exist in favor of the illegitimate.' A survey of the salient Civil
Code articles will serve to draw a clear distinction between the
respective rights of the two classes.
Distinctions based on legitimacy or illegitimacy pervade the law
of successions. Rudimentary provisions governing the rank of heirs
in an intestate succession provide an example. Article 886 provides:
"If there is no testament .. .the succession is then open in favor of
the legitimate heirs . . . ." This limitation excludes the illegitimate
from the list of legal heirs in an intestate succession.",
Another area of discrimination concerns the concept of represen-
tation. 6 Illegitimates have been denied this important right, though
it does exist in favor of legitimate relations in two situations. 7
Although this denial is not expressly included in the Code, Louisiana
jurisprudence has unequivocally held that representation is not
available in an irregular succession."
12. LA. CiV. CODE art. 179 provides: "Legitimate children are those who are either
born or conceived during marriage or who have been legitimated as provided
hereafter."
13. LA. CiV. CODE art. 180 provides: "Illegitimate children are those who are con-
ceived and born out of marriage."
14. Aside from the limited rights of inheritance granted illegitimates in articles
918, 919, and 923, articles 918 and 919 provide the payment of alimony to an illegiti-
mate who is excluded from the estate. The exclusion is to be determined by articles
240 through 244.
15. The first class of heirs in an intestate succession is that of descendants. LA.
CIV. CODE art. 902. In default of descendants, the deceased's siblings and parents share
together in equal halves. If but one parent survives, only one-fourth is taken, and
three-fourths goes to the siblings. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 903-04. If no parents survive, the
siblings exclude all other relations. LA. Civ. CODE art. 912. Provision is made for a
smaller share if a sibling be of the half blood. LA. Civ. CODE art. 913. In default of sib-
lings and parents, the class of ascendants inherits, those of the closest relation exclud-
ing all others. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 905-07. In default of all classes mentioned previously,
collateral relations inherit, those of the closest surviving generation excluding all
others. LA. Civ. CODE art. 914. See text at notes 92-99, infra.
16. Representation is a fiction which allows a person to assume "the place, degree,
and rights of the person represented." LA. Civ. CODE art. 894. This tool permits a
person to assume a higher class of relation in the estate of the deceased-a rank
higher than the party would possess without representation. Thus the party will share
the estate with persons of rank equal to that of the represented party instead of being
excluded by them. See text at notes 100-02, infra.
17. LA. Civ. CODE art. 895 states that "[rlepresentation takes place ad infinitum in
the direct descending line." Representation also takes place "in favor of the children
and descendants of the brothers and sisters of the deceased .... LA. CIV. CODE art.
897. Representation is available only in these two situations.
18. Hawkins v. Williams, 146 La. 529, 83 So. 796 (1920). The Hawkins court stated
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The rules providing the rights of seizin"9 in favor of the "legal
heir" likewise do not operate in favor of the illegitimate. "Legal
heir" refers to the succeeding heir in a legal succession. As already
noted, legal successions are limited to the deceased's legitimate rela-
tions.20
The concept of forced heirship2' also presents a situation in
which the benefit favors legitimate persons but not illegitimate
ones. Article 1493 speaks of a disposable portion which is dependent
upon the number of "legitimate" children. ' A certain portion of the
deceased's estate is required to go to the legitimate child or child:
ren. No such protection inures to the illegitimate child.
As to separate property of the parents, the acknowledged ille-
gitimate,2" under articles 9184 and 919," may succeed to the estate.
In the case of the deceased mother, the acknowledged illegitimate
succeeds only in default of legitimate descendants to the exclusion
of all other legitimate relations. If the father is deceased, the ille-
that the reasons for denying representation to irregular successions are "very plain."
These reasons consist of the fact that: 1) irregular heirs are not possessed of the right
to seizin; and 2) the representation provisions are placed, physically, in the chapter
"Of Legal Successions," and are not mentioned in the chapter "Of Irregular Succes-
sions."
19. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 940-46. See text at notes 103-07, infra.
20. See text at note 15, supra.
21. Forced heirship is a civil law concept which provides that a certain portion of
all the property owned by a man during his lifetime is reserved for the descendants of
the deceased, and in default of any descendants, for his parents, if they survive him.
This portion, the legitime, cannot be impinged upon by the testament of the deceased,
or by donations inter vivos that the deceased has made. See LA. CIv. CODE arts.
1493-94.
22. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1493 provides in pertinent part: "Donations inter ViVOs or
mortis causa can not exceed two-thirds of the property of the disposer, if he leaves, at
his decease, a legitimate child; one-half, if he leaves two children; and one-third, if he
leaves three or a greater number."
23. The illegitimate, under articles 918 and 919, must be "duly acknowledged" in
order to succeed to the parent's estate. Article 203 provides that the acknowledgment
may be made by one of the two methods: 1) a notarial act declaring acknowledgment;
or 2) by registering the birth or baptism of the child. These are the only methods
stipulated by the Code. However, an informal acknowledgment was adopted juris-
prudentially. Such acknowledgment "results from any act of the parent expressing or
implying parentage of the child, and decisions have given it the same effect as formal
acknowledgment for all purposes in favor of the child .... " Pascal, supra note 11, at
169. See generally Allen v. Anderson, 55 So. 2d 596 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951).
24. LA. Civ. CODE art. 918 provides: "Illegitimate children are called to the legal
succession of their mother, when they have been duly acknowledged by her, if she has
left no lawful children or descendants, to the exclusion of her father and mother and
other ascendants or collaterals of lawful kindred."
25. See note 2, supra.
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gitimate succeeds only in default of all legitimate relations and a
surviving spouse. The illegitimate excludes only the state.26
With regard to community property of a deceased spouse, arti-
cle 915 expressly limits the succession to legitimate descendantsY In
default of this class, the surviving spouse succeeds either jointly
with the parents of the deceased, or, if none survive, alone. Thus the
relatively high rank given an illegitimate in the succession of his
mother under article 918 is negated if community property is in-
volved-the surviving spouse, and not the acknowledged ille-
gitimate, takes the estate in default of legitimate descendants. 8
Article 923,1 as interpreted by the courts,"o gives the ille-
gitimate a place in the estate of his illegitimate siblings. In this
situation, the rules discriminate against the legitimate child for a
change, since children born of lawful wedlock cannot succeed to the
estate of their illegitimate siblings; of course, the illegitimate cannot
inherit from his legitimate siblings.
Article 921"1 is the most restrictive article of all those
26. The inheritance ladder established in articles 918 and 919 sets up a scheme
which discriminates not only between legitimates and illegitimates, but within the
class of illegitimates also. An illegitimate is given a relatively high rank in the inheri-
tance of his mother, as opposed to a low rank as to the estate of his father. This
distinction seems to be the result of a practical social consideration. The usual case of
illegitimacy results in the child's being reared by the mother. See text at note 82,
infra. It is reasonable for such a child to have a high standing in the inheritance of his
mother. Conversely, the illegitimate child normally is separated from his father.
Athough some sort of support may be lent by the father, the illegitimate rarely
becomes part of the father's family unit, and is thus given a lower echelon inheritance
right as regards his father.
27. Prior to Act 607 of 1979 the article read: "When either husband or wife shall
die, leaving neither a father nor mother, nor descendants .... " The modern article, on
the other hand, states: "When either husband or wife shall die, leaving neither a father
nor mother nor legitimate descendants . . . ." LA. CIv. CODE art. 915 (as it appeared
prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 607) (emphasis added). Brooks v. House, 168 La. 542, 122 So.
844 (1929), interpreted the pre-1979 article to allow an acknowledged illegitimate child
to exclude the surviving spouse from the community property of the deceased. This
case ,was negated by Act 607 of 1979.
28. Although article 918 grants the illegitimate second-tier ranking in the succes-
sion of the mother, this article is overridden as regards community property by article
915, which states that in the absence of legitimate descendants, the spouse inherits
either jointly with the parents of the deceased or alone in their default.
29. LA. CiV. CODE art. 923 provides: "If the father and mother of the illegitimate
child have died before him, or have not acknowledged him, the estate of such child
shall pass to his brothers and sisters."
30. Succession of Wesley, 224 La. 182, 69 So. 2d 8 (1954), ruled that the "natural"
brothers and sisters shall inherit the estate of a deceased illegitimate child.
31. LA. CiV. CODE art. 921 provides: "The law does not grant any right of inheri-
tance of illegitimate children to the estate of the legitimate relations of their father or
mother."
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distinguishing illegitimate's rights. It denies the illegitimate any
right of inheritance to the successions of legitimate relations of his
parents. This provision relegates the illegitimate to the narrow
status illustrated by articles 918, 919, and 923. Thus one can see how
serious the discrimination created by the Civil Code is in this area.
Although these laws have existed for a considerable time, courts
have been in the process of mitigating the harshness of their effects
through progressive steps in the interpretation of the equal protec-
tion clause of the United States Constitution, 2 and, in Louisiana,
under article one, section three of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution.'
The Road To Brown
Discrimination against persons of illegitimate status has been
eroded in the successions context, as well as other areas of the law,'
through federal and state decisions interpreting the contours of
equal protection under the law. The concept of equal protection is
responsible for abating, to some degree, the discrimination aimed at
illegitimates in successions law. Although certain legal distinctions
based on legitimacy classifications are inevitable, 5 the distinctions
in rights drawn on the basis of such classifications must, to be valid,
bear a close relationship to a legitimate state interest. The equal
protection clause, as interpreted, does not preclude all instances of
discrimination, but only those that have no rational basis. "Statutory
classifications, of course, are not per se unconstitutional; the matter
depends upon the character of the discrimination and its relation to
legitimate legislative aims.""6 The connexity between the statutory
distinctions and the state interest is fundamental under an equal
protection analysis. The court's determination of the strictness
required of the connexity between the means and the end will in
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "No state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
33. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3 provides: "No person shall be denied the equal protec-
tion of the laws . . . . No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably
discriminate against a person because of birth, age ...." (Emphasis added.)
34. See, e.g., Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (illegitimacy distinctions
determining availability of Social Security payments struck down); New Jersey
Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (statute limiting welfare
benefits to families with legitimate children struck down); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (provision denying equal relief to illegitimates for workmen's
compensation recovery for death of father held unconstitutional); Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68 (1968). See text at notes 40-44, infra.
35. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978). Legitimate reasons for enacting
statutes decreeing disparate rights for illegitimates do exist, as Lalli demonstrates.
The equal protection clause prohibits unreasonable denials of right-those which have
no rational relation to a permissible state interest.
36. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1976).
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most cases foretell whether the discriminatory law will withstand
constitutional scrutiny. The degree of scrutiny applied by the courts
has varied; the evolution of the applicable constitutional standard
for birth classifications will be sketched briefly to demonstrate the
slowly moving trend from minimum scrutiny to a higher, more demand-
ing level of analysis.
Because the enforcement of the spirit of the equal protection
clause is dependent to a great extent on the standard that is preva-
lent at the time, identifying and articulating the elements of the
applicable standard is extremely important. Only then can the
mettle of existing laws be analyzed and any potential constitutional
deficiencies be uncovered. The jurisprudence construing equal pro-
tection developed a two-tier system of analyzing challenged laws."
According to the courts' perceptions of priorities in discrimination,
courts utilized either the upper level "strict scrutiny" or the lower
level "minimum rationality" analysis. When courts employed the
strict scrutiny standard, it was extremely difficult for a statute to
withstand the analysis.38 Conversely, the lower standard was almost
cursory in nature, giving maximum deference to the legislature's
will in enacting the law. 9 Mindful of this dichotomy, one must attempt
to identify the standard which has been assigned to the distinctions
in rights based on the classification of birth. The findings of the
court in individual cases reflect the conscience of the court and show
what priority it feels the birth classifications deserve.
Levy v. Louisiana,' though not a successions case, dealt with
the validity of a distinction based on legitimacy or illegitimacy in
37. The "two-tier" system of equal protection was keyed by the subject of the
statutory classifications. The upper tier "strict scrutiny" test was applied to classifica-
tions deemed "suspect". Examples of such distinctions are those based on race and nation-
ality. Statutes discriminating on these bases are required to support a compelling state
purpose. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967).
The lower tier standard is one of minimal scrutiny. The statute is invalid only if it
bears no rational relation to a legitimate state interest. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
38. The author could not find a case in which a discriminatory statute survived a
strict scrutiny analysis.
39. "We cannot say that Louisiana's policy provides a perfect or even a desirable
solution or the one we would have provided for the problem of the property rights of
illegitimate children. Neither can we say that Louisiana does not have the power to
make laws for distribution of property left within the State." Labine v. Vincent, 401
U.S. 532, 539 (1971). See text at notes 45-49, infra.
"In applying the Equal Protection Clause to social and economic legislation, we
give great latitude to the legislature in making classifications." Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
40. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
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the area of wrongful death benefits. The illegitimate child could not
bring a wrongful death action for the death of his mother, whereas
the law established such a right in favor of the legitimate child.,'
The United States Supreme Court, employing a minimum rationality
test, found the Louisiana law unconstitutional. The interest the law
allegedly promoted was that of protecting legitimate family relation-
ships. The Court found that "[l]egitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has
no relation to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the
mother." 2 The challenged statute could not even meet the minimum
rationality requirements. The Levy decision, already favorable in its
view of illegitimates' rights, offered even more promise for the
future. Athough the analysis was labeled a minimum rationality test,
the Court stated that "we have been extremely sensitive when it
comes to basic civil rights . . . .'"' Basic or fundamental civil rights
have received strict scrutiny in some cases;" thus the Court's
language offered hope that in the future classifications based on
birth could be susceptible to strict scrutiny-an eventuality which
would go far in invalidating discriminatory laws in the area of ille-
gitimate inheritance rights.
This "promise" took a step backward in Labine v. Vincent,4'5 a
Supreme Court case dealing with the validity of Louisiana Civil Code
article 919.6 Although ostensibly applying a minimum rationality
test, seemingly the Court passed over even this lower level standard.
The Court simply used a power analysis; once it determined that a
state had the power to establish laws strengthening family ties and
providing for the orderly disposition of property, the inquiry
ended. 7 Birth classifications seemed to be placed in a very "non-
41. Article 2315 of the Civil Code had been interpreted to apply only to legitimate
children, although the article's wording provides that the primary beneficiaries are
"the surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased."
42. 391 U.S. at 72 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 71.
44. For example, the right to vote and the right to travel interstate have been
classified as "fundamental" rights. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Electors, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
In Levy, the basic civil rights asserted "involve the intimate, familial relationship
between a child and his own mother." 391 U.S. at 71.
45. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
46. See note 2, supra.
47. The dissenters came to the defense of the minimum rationality concept.
"[Elven in cases of economic regulation," the dissent states, "this Court will inquire,
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, whether there is
some 'reasonable basis' for [a discriminatory state statute] .... Such an inquiry does
not question the State's power to regulate .... " 401 U.S. at 547-48. (Brennan, Douglas,
White, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
"Surely the Court cannot be saying that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro-
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suspect" light. Levy was distinguished on the grounds that it sounded
in tort"8 and that no insurmountable barrier existed; 9 the Labine
Court found that article 919 erected no "insurmountable barrier"
against the illegitimate. The father could, if he chose, bequeath prop-
erty to the illegitimate child.
The decision of Trimble v. Gordon"0 was rendered six years
later. At issue was an Illinois law similar to article 919.1 The law
was held unconstitutional. The Labine case, though not overruled,
was distinguished in part: "Despite these differences, it is apparent
that we have examined the Illinois statute more critically than the
Court examined the Louisiana statute in Labine. To the extent that
our analysis in this case differs from that in Labine the more recent
analysis controls." 2 This standard was not strict scrutiny, but
something more stringent than the Labine test was applied. In the
words of the Court, the scrutiny was not a "toothless one." 3 The
standard seemed to be an intermediate one; it lay between strict
scrutiny" and minimum rationality. The priority assigned to birth
classifications was visibly higher after Trimble.
Lalli v. Lalli55 reaffirmed and clarified the Trimble method of
analysis while upholding a discriminatory statute.6 The Court adopted
the Trimble middle level test and articulated it this way: although
not subject to strict scrutiny, classifications based on illegitimacy
"are invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment if they are not
substantially related to permissible state interests." 7 This "substan-
tection Clause is inapplicable to subjects regulable by the States-that extraordinary
proposition would reverse a century'of constitutional adjudication under [the equal pro-
tection clause]." Id. at 548-49.
48. 401 U.S. at 535-36.
49. Id. at 537.
50. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-2 (1976). This statute permits the illegitimate to
inherit from the mother but not the father. A legitimate child would inherit from the
father.
52. 430 U.S. at 776 n.17.
53. Id. at 767.
54. The plaintiff made the argument that the classification should be held
"suspect." The Court stated that although "illegitimacy is analogous in many respects
to the personal characteristics that we have held to be suspect when used as the basis
of statutory differentiations .... [w]e nevertheless [conclude] that the analogy [is] not
sufficient to require 'our most exacting scrutiny.'" Id.
The "suspect" classification argument was forwarded and lost earlier in Mathews
v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). It was in Mathews that the Court first noted that the
middle-level scrutiny was not a "toothless one."
55. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
56. The law at issue provided that the illegitimate, in order to inherit from his
father in an intestate succession, must obtain a judicial order of filiation during the
lifetime of the father.
57. 439 U.S. at 265.
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tial relationship" label does not, in a practical sense, expose the
strictness of the standard. It can properly be seen in terms of a
means-end format. The "means"-in this case the discriminatory
statute-used by the state to promote or protect the "end"-the per-
missible state interest-must bear a substantial relationship to such
interest. A balancing test is used; the court weighs the gravity of
the rights denied the disfavored class against the importance of the
state interest.' Applying this test, the Lalli Court found that the
state law stood in the face of this scrutiny. 9 The statute at issue
provided that an illegitimate could inherit from his father if certain
procedural guidelines concerning proof of filiation were followed."
The Court found constitutional this "means" of promoting the state's
interest in insuring the orderly disposition of property at death.
Important was the fact that rights on behalf of the illegitimate could
be as great as those of legitimates, though contingent upon the ille-
gitimate's following the filiation procedure. The Lalli decision seem-
ingly would have been different had the law simply barred the
rights of illegitimates when legitimates survived."'
In Louisiana equal protection exists in two forms, the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution and article one, sec-
tion three of the Louisiana Constitution. Article one, section three
has been interpreted as not unlike the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Succession of Thompson6 dealt with article
1483, which prohibited illegitimate children from receiving legacies
from their mother if legitimate children survived. The article was
held unconstitutional. The court held that the validity of discrimina-
tory classifications of this type was contingent upon the existence of
a reasonable relation between the law and a valid governmental
interest." The court found no relation between the prohibition of
58. LaW, like Trimble, rejected the argument that by regulating the rights of ille-
gitimates, discriminatory statutes promote the state's interest in legitimate family
relationships. These statutes are not "defensible as an incentive to enter legitimate
family relationships." Id.
59. The goal underlying the statute is to provide for "the just and orderly disposi-
tion of property at death. We long have recognized that this is an area with which the
States have an interest of considerable magnitude." Id. at 268. The Court noted that
this interest is "directly implicated in paternal inheritance by illegitimate children
because of the peculiar problems of proof that are involved." Id.
60. See note 56, supra.
61. The Court determined that the law in Trimble was invalid because "it effected
a total statutory disinheritance of children born out of wedlock who were not
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their parents. The reach of the statute was
far in excess of its justifiable purposes." 439 U.S. at 273.
62. 367 So. 2d 796 (La. 1979).
63. The court cited Trimble as authority for the test employed. Id. at 800. This
evidences the court's intent to subject the statute to a middle-level analysis.
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maternal donations and the orderly disposition of property at
death. 4
With this background of significant federal and state juris-
prudence established, the Louisiana Supreme Court had occasion to
reevaluate the validity of article 919 in Succession of Brown.
The Brown Decision
Sidney Brown, Jr. died intestate on January 1, 1978. Brown
fathered five children, all of whom were born illegitimate. Brown
later adopted one of the children, thus giving her the status of a
legitimate child. This legitimate child became the legal heir"5 of
Brown, and the trial court granted a judgment of possession in her
favor. The four remaining illegitimate children were excluded from
their father's succession under pertinent Louisiana law. The illegiti-
mates sought to overturn the trial court's judgment. The decision
was reversed by the second circuit"6 and was affirmed by the
supreme court. The crux of the two decisions was a finding that arti-
cle 9197 was unconstitutional insofar as it gave inferior rights to
illegitimate children.
Of paramount importance is the standard of constitutional
scrutiny adopted by the court in determining the validity of the arti-
cle. This is critical because the remainder of Louisiana's succession
provisions must be evaluated under the light shed by this level of
scrutiny. The court expressly adopts the "middle-level" analysis,6
rejecting the minimum rationality test of Labine. The Trimble/Lalli
analysis serves as the unit of measurement in determining the con-
stitutional validity of article 919.
Under this level of scrutiny, the court indicated that "the
classification set forth in article 919 must be substantially related to
64. The Thompson court adhered to the analysis of Succession of Robins, 349 So.
2d 276 (La. 1977), in which article 1488 of the Code was held unconstitutional. Article
1488 provided that "natural fathers and mothers can, in no case, dispose of property in
favor of their adulterine or incestuous children, unless to the mere amount of what is
necessary to their sustenance .... " The Robins court found no reasonable basis for
the discriminatory statute. The concern for legitimate relationships was not promoted
by this article. In this instance also, Trimble was cited as authority for the equal pro-
tection analysis applied.
65. The child's adoption erased the status of illegitimacy. LA. Civ. CODE art. 214:
"The adopted person is considered for all purposes as the legitimate child . . . of the
adoptive parents or parents .... "
66. Succession of Brown, 379 So. 2d 1172 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
67. See note 2, supra.
68. "[T]he two tier approach of Dukes has been refined to allow for a middle level
of analysis for statutes based on such categories as sex .... and illegitimates .... 388
So. 2d at 1152.
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permissible state interests.""5 The court made no distinction be-
tween the analysis used for the United States Constitution and that
used for article one, section three of the Louisiana Constitution. Ap-
parently, the Louisiana Supreme Court used the same analysis to
satisfy the mandates of both provisions.
In seeking to determine whether a substantial relationship
exists between the "means" offered in article 919 and a permissible
state interest, the court recognized three potential "ends" to be con-
sidered: 1) the promotion of legitimate family relationships; 2) the
orderly disposition of property at death; and 3) the possibilities the
father could have exercised to insure the illegitimates a part of the
succession. No "insurmountable barrier" existed against the ille-
gitimate child. 0
The court quickly disposed of the first interest because of the
means utilized to accomplish it. The interest in legitimate family
relations cannot serve as the desired "end" of a statute discrimin-
ating against illegitimate children in the estates of their parents.
The state cannot "attempt to influence the actions of men and
women by imposing sanctions on the children born of their illegiti-
mate relationships."'" In other words, the state cannot punish child-
ren for the transgressions of their parents."2
The "insurmountable barrier" notion, although listed as a state
interest by the court, is simply a consideration that allegedly should
help cure a constitutional deficiency to the extent that the parent
could, of his own volition, bequeath property to the illegitimate
which the law, perhaps unconstitutionally, would not leave him. The
court disregarded this consideration. The court focused on the fact
that the father did not provide for the children, and thus "the
acknowledged illegitimates' rights should not hinge on mere hypo-
theses of what the father might have done."78 It appears that the
court has abandoned this interest for all constitutional purposes as
being an "analytical anomaly," as indicated earlier in Trimble.
The valid remaining interest is that of the orderly disposition of
property at death. However, the state interest of stable land titles
and orderly disposition of property will serve as a justification only
69. Id. at 1153.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. The key element is that the means of article 919 is not a proper or acceptable
way of promoting the interest of legitimate family relationships. This does not
preclude the possibility that a statute could exist punishing the parents of the illegiti-
mate in an effort to promote the family. See text at notes 95-99, infra.
73. 388 So. 2d at 1153.
74. 430 U.S. at 773.
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for a reasonable statute seeking to perpetuate the legitimate state
goal or "end." A substantial relationship must exist between the
two. The permissible goal of protecting land titles and of seeing to
the orderly disposition of property at death is not achieved by arti-
cle 919, "which flatly denies [the illegitimate's] succession rights if
other relatives exist."75 A valid example of discrimination based on
birth classification can be seen in Lalli 6 The illegitimate had to
meet formal requirements in proving his filiation to his father; if the
procedure was not followed, the claim to the estate of the father
was denied. The court found that the means used was substantially
related to the permissible "end" of seeking orderly disposition of
property and thus was valid. A method existed through which the ille-
gitimate could ascend to a position equal to that of the legitimates.
This was vital to the success of the statute in Lalli. Article 919, con-
versely, provided no way for the illegitimate to achieve equal pro-
tection in the succession of his father if other relatives exist."
The Louisiana Supreme Court, limited in the scope of its ruling
by the facts of Brown, held only article 919 unconstitutional and
noted that, subject to laws related substantially to the state's inter-
est in orderly disposition of property at death,78 illegitimate children
must share equally with their legitimate siblings in intestate succes-
sions. This holding is a rather narrow one, but the forces at work in
reaching the decision make the admittedly narrow holding a harbin-
ger of change as regards the rights of illegitimates and the rights
of other relations vis-i-vis illegitimates under the Louisiana succes-
sion scheme. Brown warrants extensive changes in succession law in
order to buttress the code provisions to a position from which they
can withstand constitutional attack similar to that in Brown.
The Legislature has several options available in reshaping Lou-
isiana's succession laws. Already, a La~li-like provision had been
adopted by the Legislature. Civil Code article 20911 provides that a
child may prove paternity by "any means which establish, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, . . . that he is the child of that man."8
This must be done by a civil proceeding "brought within six months
75. 388 So. 2d at 1154.
76. See note 56, supra.
77. "[B]oth the United States and Louisiana Constitutions prohibit the total denial
of inheritance rights of acknowledged illegitimates in the succession of the father who
is survived by other relations." 388 So. 2d at 1154.
78. "Absent any legislative authority to remedy their loss of succession rights ....
we find the statute . . .denies them the equal protection of the law." Id. This is an
obvious reference to the validity of a Lai-like statute. See text at notes 79-85, infra.
79. Article 209 was established by Act 549 of 1980.
80. LA. CiV. CODE art. 209.
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after the death of the alleged parent, or within nineteen years of the
illegitimate child's birth, whichever occurs first."8 This law, like
that in Lalli, is an attempt to promote the state's interest in stable
land titles and in orderly disposition of property at death. This inter-
est is threatened in the case of an illegitimate succeeding his father
because of the difficult proof problem inherent in demonstrating
paternity. Maternity seldom presents such problems. "The birth of a
child is a recorded or registered event usually taking place in the
presence of others. In most cases the child remains with the mother
and for a time is necessarily reared by her."8 In the case of the
father, however, illegitimate children not even known may exist.
Thus, if the illegitimate is given rights equal to those of the legiti-
mate child, a judgment of possession in favor of legitimate children
may be challenged later by a "secret illegitimate lurking in the
buried past of a parent ....,"' Since title to real property transfers
under the judgment, it is imperative that any illegitimate having a
claim under the succession prove his filiation within a certain speci-
fied time to insure the stability of land titles. Also, the possibility of
spurious claims by alleged illegitimates could cause litigation in the
estate of the deceased, thus creating disorder in the succession and
harassing heirs with a rightful claim to the succession."4 Without a
law regulating the filiation procedure of an illegitimate, orderly
disposition of property at death could be impossible to achieve.
The validity of article 209 seems reasonably certain in view of
the Lalli decision. The decision and rationale in Lalli are closely
analogous to any inquiry made regarding the constitutionality of
article 209. The "means" used bears a substantial relationship to the
state's desired "end" of providing for orderly disposition of property
at death. The state provides a method, though somewhat limited, by
which the illegitimate can prove filiation. The limitations appear
reasonable, however, in light of the state's interest, which is "of con-
siderable magnitude."85 Thus article 209 is an example of reasonable
81. LA. CIV. CODE art. 209.
82. 439 U.S. at 268, quoting In re Ortiz, 60 Misc. 2d 756, 761, 303 N.Y.S.2d 806,
812 (1969).
83. Id. at 270, quoting In re Flemm, 85 Misc. 2d 855, 859, 381 N.Y.S.2d 573, 573-76
(Surr. Ct. 1975).
84. 439 U.S. at 270.
85. Id. at 267. Louisiana law varies in its treatment of the interest in stability of
land titles. Article 209 demonstrates a positive step in promoting this interest. Con-
versely, articles 1517 and 1518 of the Code create a situation in which land titles are
anything but stable. These articles provide for an action in revendication in favor of
the forced heirs. When the donee who is subject to an action in reduction (because the
legitime was impinged upon by donations inter vivos) has alienated the immovable pro-
perty, the disadvantage heir may bring an action to recover the property from the
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discrimination against the class of illegitimates. If the Legislature
takes no further action and allows the courts to continue their analy-
sis of the code, overruling articles considered unconstitutional, the
law of successions could be thrown into uncertainty indefinitely.
This approach is not recommended.
Alternatively, the Legislature could revise those code provisions
which seem deficient constitutionally in light of the Brown rationale.
Articles dictating disparate treatment for successions purposes in
the case of a legitimate or an illegitimate must be reevaluated. Re-
examination does not require that in all cases the benefit granted to
legitimates be extended to illegitimates. The Constitution does not
require that the benefit exist, but it does mandate that any benefit
created be created equally, unless a legitimate state interest exists
to justify discriminatory treatment. However, the Legislature could
decide to abrogate the benefit altogether. This would equalize treat-
ment of the two classes with as much efficacy as if the benefit were
extended to the class of illegitimates. In some cases, withdrawal of
the right may be a more desirable remedy. This analysis will pro-
ceed under the assumption that the Legislature will extend existing
benefits to the class of illegitimates, as this was the remedy chosen
by the court in Brown.
The third consideration which the Legislature faces concerns
those articles of the code which, although not unconstitutional in
light of Brown, must receive different application since Brown has
changed other related laws. These articles may no longer achieve
the effect originally contemplated by the Legislature; and, it may be
desirable to amend these articles as well.
Necessary Changes
Fundamental changes of extensive scope are required under
Louisiana's successions law. The thrust of Brown, read in light of
the legislative intent of article 209, requires that proven biological
children of a parent must stand in the same position as proven legi-
timate children." This basic concept calls for drastic amendment of
third party. R.S. 9:5682 provides a similar action. Any heir or legatee who was not
recognized by the court in a judgment of possession may sue to recover property
transferred to a third party by an heir or legatee who received the property from the
succession of the deceased. Obviously, in such situations the Legislature has determined
that the stability of land titles is not paramount and does not outweigh the interest in
insuring that an heir receives his share of a succession.
86. The problem presented in proving filiation of illegitimates does not arise if the
child is acknowledged. Once acknowledged, the child has no need of a filiation pro-
cedure; the filiation has been established by the parent's own action.
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virtually all of the articles creating inheritance benefits for legi-
timate persons, because in all those cases, illegitimate relations are
treated less favorably.
Since article 919 was held unconstitutional in Brown, the articles
which accompany it, dealing with the rank of illegitimates in irre-
gular successions, are rendered vulnerable. The invalidity of article
91887 seems clear, since the reasoning of Brown applies almost
directly to this article. Although the illegitimate's place in the
estate of his mother is higher than that granted in article 919, the
inferior status accorded him in relation to legitimate children
renders the article constitutionally infirm. As was stated in Brown,
"it is apparent that the respondents are being discriminated against
because of their birth status, for had they been born legitimate,""8
they would succeed their mother in the first rank. Article 918 pro-
vides no method whereby the illegitimate could remedy the loss of
succession rights vis-h-vis the legitimate child of the mother. The
means employed in the legislative scheme-the granting of an abso-
lutely superior right to a legitimate child of the mother-does not
bear substantial relation to a permissible legislative "end." Because
the proof problems which exist in the case of paternity do not exist
in the case of maternity, a law discriminating against illegitimates in
the succession of their mother does not promote the state's interest
in orderly disposition of property. Also, as previously mentioned,
the family harmony interest cannot be promoted by punishing the
product of illicit relations."
Article-921"' also seems deficient. It denies the illegitimate any
inheritance rights in the successions of legitimate relations of his
parents. Of course, the child would have such rights if he were born
legitimate. Punishing children in this manner can be perpetrated
only in an effort to protect land titles and to insure the orderly
disposition of property at death. Courts will not view favorably
statutes which effectively punish children for the sins of their
parents in an attempt to deter illicit family relations. It is submitted
that article 921 will not withstand constitutional scrutiny in light of
Brown. Surely such a broad denial of rights to illegitimates is too
extreme a method of promoting the legitimate interest of orderly
disposition of property. A requirement that filiation be demon-
strated within a certain time, as provided in article 209, would be a
reasonable manner of promoting such an interest.91
87. See note 24, supra.
88. 388 So. 2d at 1154.
89. See note 72, supra.
90. See note 31, supra.
91. See text at notes 79-85, supra.
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The focus shifts to perhaps the most rudimentary rules in suc-
cession law, the rank of heirs in a legal intestate succession which is
established in articles 902-914 of the Code. As noted earlier, the
entire successions scheme is fraught with the notion that devolution
of property accrues only in favor of legitimate relations. With article
921 no longer vital, illegitimates should take their place in the succes-
sions of legitimate relations of their parents, as well as the estates of
their parents themselves.
Any distinction in right assigned to illegitimate children which
is more demanding than a reasonable requirement governing the
proof of filiation (article 209) would seem to be unreasonable follow-
ing Brown.92 As regards a chad inheriting from his parents or grand-
parents, the articles granting paramount ranking to descendants
now must include legitimate and illegitimate descendants, subject to
a reasonable filiation procedure." The goal of orderly disposition of
property is not attained reasonably by a law granting illegitimate
descendants a position lower in the scheme of intestate successions.
Such a rule violates equal protection.
Article 914 places collateral relations other than siblings in a
low position in the law of intestate successions. If an illegitimate col-
lateral has proven sufficiently his filiation within the family, it is dif-
ficult to contemplate a reasonable cause for excluding him from the
class of collaterals. He cannot be excluded in an effort to foster
legitimate family relations since Trimble and Brown have
demonstrated that this interest will not support discrimination
against the product of illicit ;relations. Lalli demonstrated that a
filiation procedure is related substantially to the interest of orderly
disposition of property; presumably article 209 achieves a similar
purpose in Louisiana. However, any rule denying completely the ille-
gitimate's position as a "collateral" seems unconstitutional. This
analysis pertains to both siblings and to more distant collateral rela-
tions.9
A more difficult question arises in the context of parents inher-
iting from their illegitimate children." If the law excluded them
92. Brown emphasizes the unreasonableness of laws which "flatly deny" in-
heritance rights to a class, as opposed to laws which grant the illegitimate an equal
right if certain procedural requirement are met. 388 So. 2d at 1154. Absent such
"legislative authority" to remedy loss of succession rights, equal protection is violated.
93. See text at notes 55-61 & 79-85, supra.
94. This would include amendment of articles 911 through 913, dealing with the
inheritance rights of brothers and sisters, and article 914, regulating the inheritance of
more distant collaterals.
95. LA. Civ. CODE art. 922 states: "The estate of an illegitimate child deceased
without posterity, belongs to the father or mother who has acknowledged him, or in
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from the estate of their illegitimate children, a different analysis
would be used in testing the constitutional validity of the law.
Trimble and Brown do not proscribe discrimination against the
parents of illegitimates in an effort to foster the state's interest in
legitimate family relationships. As was noted in Trimble, "no one
disputes the appropriateness of Illinois' concern with the family
unit, perhaps the most fundamental social institution of our society."96
The Court simply found that no reasonable relation existed between
the state's interest in family harmony and a statute discriminating
against illegitimate children.
Analogous instances of discrimination against parents exist in
the Code. Article 214, for example, provides that the blood parents
of an adopted child are "relieved of all of their legal duties and
divested of all of their legal rights . .. including the right of inher-
itance from the adopted person . . . ." Also illustrative is article
118,98 which denies the civil effects of marriage to a bad faith
putative spouse. The civil effects in such a case are produced only in
favor of the good faith spouse and the children of the marriage.
Being denied the civil effects of the marriage, the bad faith spouse
has no rights of inheritance as regards the children of the putative
marriage." However, this analysis may not be valid if all ascendants
are excluded. It would not be reasonable to punish the child's grand-
parents since they are not the "wrongdoers." This would probably
equal portions to the father and mother, when he has been acknowledged by both of
them."
96. 430 U.S. at 769.
97. LA. CIV. CODE art. 214 (emphasis added).
98. LA. CiV. CODE art. 118: "If only one of the parties acted in good faith, the mar-
riage produces its civil effects only in his or her favor, and in favor of the children
born of the marriage."
99. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1978), is a case in which the state was found
to have gone too far in sanctioning the participants of illicit relationships in an effort
to protect legitimate family relations. The Massachusetts statute permitted married
persons to obtain contraceptives but refused the same to single persons. The state
asserted its interest in controlling premarital sex (an important variation of preserv-
ing legitimate relationships) as the basis for the law. The Court held the law unconsti-
tutional, finding that the state interests involved warranted neither an infringement on
the privacy of an individual, nor a denial of equal protection (unmarried vs. married
persons).
The Massachusetts statute is more extreme than a law simply denying parents
the right to inherit from their illegitimate offspring. The Court does not deny the
right to engage in illicit sexual relationships without fear of conception; only the rights
normally accruing from the relationship are curtailed. The illicit relations are being
deterred after the fact, rather than before the fact. It is submitted that the interest in
preserving legitimate family relationships would be related substantially to a law
excluding the parent from the estate of his illegitimate child.
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be violative of equal protection. The article should be restricted to
exclude only the parents of the illegitimate.
In light of the foregoing analysis, the illegitimate should be
included in Chapter Two-"Of Legal Successions." Thus, the impor-
tant benefit of representation necessarily follows for illegitimate
descendants of the deceased and for illegitimate descendants of the
siblings of the deceased. No rational basis exists for distinguishing
illegitimate children in this area. These are the only two situations
in which the right of representation arises."' Presently, only legiti-
mate children are favored by the fiction of representation.' If the
right is extended to illegitimates, the illegitimate will share in the
succession of his grandfather by representing his predeceased father
in the same manner as his legitimate siblings. Without the benefit of
representation, the illegitimate would be excluded either by uncles
and aunts or by his legitimate siblings who rose to the same rank as
those uncles and aunts through representation.' 2
The benefit of seizin also must be reconsidered. Conceptually,
seizin gives the legal heir constructive possession of the deceased's
estate from the moment of death.0' Thus, the heir continues uninter-
rupted possession of the deceased's property. Also, theoretically the
heir can sue on the rights of the deceased.' The heir also is consi-
dered to transmit the succession to his heirs in the event of his
death.O
Louisiana law has weakened the heir's right of seizin. Code of
Civil Procedure article 3211 provides that the "succession represen-
tative shall be deemed to have possession of all the property of the
succession .... ."10 With the vesting of seizin rights in the adminis-
trator of the succession, the heirs' rights of seizin are negated effec-
100. See note 17, supra.
101. See Hawkins v. Williams, 146 La. 529, 83 So. 796 (1920).
102. If the representing party were forced to claim a part of the estate in his own
right, he would be excluded by the brothers and sisters of his deceased parent and by
legitimate grandchildren representing their deceased parent.
103. LA. CiV. CODE art. 942 provides: "The heir being considered seized of the suc-
cession from the moment of its being opened, the right of possession, which the deceased
had, continues in the person of the heir, as if there had been no interruption, and inde-
pendent of the fact of possession."
104. LA. CIv. CODE art. 945 provides: "The second effect of this right is to
authorize the heir to institute all the actions, even possessory ones, which the deceased
had a right to institute .
105. LA. CIV. CODE art. 944 states: "The heir being considered as having succeeded
to the deceased from the instant of his death, the first effect of this right is that the
heir transmits the succession to his own heirs.
106. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3211.
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tively.' °7 Still, in those successions which are not administered, the
right of seizin exists in favor of the legal heir, which now should
include illegitimate heirs, as well as those of legitimate status. On
the basis of the rights which seizin grants, no reason appears to
exist to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate heirs.
One of the greatest benefits available to the illegitimate is the
concept of forced heirship. Presently, among descendants, only those
of legitimate birth receive the advantage of a. forced portion from
which they cannot be disinherited freely. The logic of Brown almost
certainly renders the limitation of forced heirship to legitimates uncon-
stitutional. Faced with the realization that illegitimate children will
have the benefit of a forced portion of their parent's estate, the
Legislature may seek to abandon the concept of forced heirship alto-
gether-a move which has been suggested in the past."8 Such a change
would require an amendment to the Louisiana Constitution, which
preserves forced heirship.'019 If forced heirship is abandoned, the law
will treat all children equally under the intestate scheme, and all
will inherit equal shares. This will allow a parent to write a will
excluding the illegitimate if such is the parent's choosing. No rule
exists which would prohibit such a denial.
A less drastic remedy would be to include the illegitimate as a
forced heir but to reduce the forced portion, thus reducing all of the
children's shares."' This would leave a larger disposable portion
which the parent could then use to favor legitimate children. The
parent could testamentarily grant the disposable portion to a legiti-
mate child, expressly bequeathing it in excess of the child's legi-
time.' The expression of an extra portion will be necessary since
with forced heirship come the appurtenant rights and obligations of
collation and reduction."2
107. Official comment (a) to article 3211 provides in pertinent part: "The utility of
the concept of seizin in Louisiana lawis doubtful, since as a practical matter the suc-
cession representative has full seizin of all the property of the deceased."
108. For an excellent article exploring the possibilities of succession law in the
absence of forced heirship, see Le Van, Alternatives to Forced Heirship, 52 TUL. L.
REV. 29 (1977).
109. LA. CONST. ART. XII, § 5 states: "No law shall abolish forced heirship. The
determination of forced heirs, the amount of the forced portion, and the grounds for
disinherison shall be provided by law."
110. See note 109, supra.
111. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1501 states: "The disposable quantum may be given in
whole or in part, by an act inter vivos or mortis causa, to one or more of the disposer's
children or successible descendants, to the prejudice of his other children or succes-
sible descendants ... provided it be expressly declared by the donor that this disposi-
tion is intended-to be over and above the legitimate portion."
112. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1227 defines collation as: "the supposed or real return to
the mass of the succession which an heir makes of property which he received in
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With regard to forced heirship and an intestate succession, an
alternative legislative solution has been postulated. The argument
has been advanced that the illegitimate be made a forced heir, but
within certain guidelines: In partitioning the decedent's estate, the
legitimate children should receive their fractional interest in the
estate, while the illegitimate should take a credit against the estate.
This credit could result in the illegitimate's being satisfied in cash
rather than in any specific movable or immovable assets. This alter-
native meshes nicely with the notion that the illegitimate's place in
the succession may cause disintegration of the economic family. unit.
Real property and family enterprises (e.g., business associations)
would be kept within the family unit. It is more likely that the
legitimate children will continue the business, which is a desirable
economic goal. Though a slight distinction in the treatment of legiti-
mates and illegitimates would exist, such distinction in rights bears
substantial relation to the state's permissible interests. Such a
scheme possibly represents a reasonably discriminatory policy."1
Desirable Changes
Once the long-range effect of Brown is appreciated fully, articles
of the Code not affected directly (ie., not unconstitutional) but
nevertheless different in their application because of Brown may no
longer implement the policy which led to their enactment.
Chief among these laws is article 916, which provides for a
usufruct in favor of the surviving spouse over community property
left by the deceased. Presently, article 916 entitles the surviving
spouse to a usufruct over the property if the naked ownership of
such property is inherited by issue of the marriage."' The usufruct
does not attach if the naked owner is. a child of a previous marriage.
After Brown, the usufruct will be defeated also by the decedent's
illegitimate child, who would exclude the spouse under article 915.2"
advance of his share .. . . in order that such property may be divided together with
the other effects of the succession."
Reduction takes place when the donations inter vivos and mortis causa made by
the deceased exceed the disposable portion. The forced heirs are able to sue to have
this impingement reduced to the quantum of the disposable portion. LA. CIv. CODE arts.
1502-18.
113. See Pascal, supra note 11, at 181-82.
114. "In all cases, when the predeceased husband or wife shall have left issue of
the marriage with the survivor, and shall not have disposed [of the property] by last
will and testament .... the survivor shall hold in usufruct ... so much of the share of
the deceased in such community property as may be inherited by such issue." LA. CIv.
CODE art. 916.
115. See text at notes 27-28, supra.
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Surely this result is not within the contemplation of article 916, since
the illegitimate had no such right of inheritance when the article
was redacted.
An amendment to article 916 may be desirable to insure that the
spouse's usufruct will attach if the naked owner is other than issue
of the marriage. In principle, article 916 would remain unchanged;
however, if this amendment is made, a possible equal protection
argument would still exist-the illegitimate could argue that the
article, by allowing the issue of a previous marriage to inherit free
of the usufruct, discriminates against the illegitimate in violation of
the Constitution. A safer solution would be to grant the usufruct
regardless of whether the naked owner is issue of the marriage,
issue of a previous marriage, or an illegitimate issue. Article 916
would be slightly different in application since the issue of a pre-
vious marriage has his inheritance impinged upon, but, most impor-
tantly, the spouse's usufruct, which is the primary concern, would
obtain in spite of the illegitimate's new status."' Such a law would
be impervious to an equal protection challenge. As written, article
916.1 presently gives the spouse a usufruct over the family home, no
matter who the naked owner is; 17 article 916 would be extended simi-
larly.
With the invalidation of Article 921, the illegitimate can expect
to be treated the same as legitimates as regards the estates of their
parents' legitimate relations. This result may cause a rethinking of
the present intestate rank of heirs. For instance, one can foresee a
situation in which an illegitimate third cousin would exclude the sur-
viving spouse as to separate property under articles 914 and 924.
These articles grant a legitimate cousin such a right. This type of
inheritance could serve to catalyze the granting to the surviving
spouse of greater rights to the estate of the deceased spouse. This
would constitute a further step in making the spouse a legal heir in
the succession of a deceased spouse." 8 Perhaps the spouse could be
116. The presently included right to extend the usufruct over the separite property
of the deceased and/or to grant it for life (instead of until remarriage, which is article
916's statutory norm) will exist also against the naked ownership of the illegitimate
and the non-issue legitimate child. This extension of 916 is not an impingement on the
heirs' legitime.
117. "In all cases, when the predeceased husband or wife shall not have disposed
by last will and testament of his or her share in the family home, the survivor shall
hold in usufruct ... the deceased's share of the family home .... " LA. CIv. CODE art.
916.1.
118. For some time there has been a slowly-moving trend in Louisiana which
favors the granting of more inheritance rights to a surviving spouse. "Under the Civil
Codes of 1808 and 1825, the surviving spouse had a low rank of inheritance in the suc-
cession of the deceased spouse .... " Oppenheim, Recent Developments in the Succes-
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made a legal heir to the deceased's separate property by moving the
class higher into the hierarchy of beneficiaries,"" either after ascen-
dants and siblings, excluding collaterals, or after collaterals of a cer-
tain degree, excluding those more distant.
Conclusion
Expedient consideration of the aforementioned articles of the
Civil Code by the Legislature hopefully will occur. The aura of uncer-
tainty generated by Brown surrounds Louisiana's law of successions,
and legislative action provides the surest and quickest method of
rectifying the situation. One certainty exists: those persons deemed
illegitimate in Louisiana anxiously await the outcome of the house-
cleaning instigated by Brown.20
Wm H. Parker, III
sion Law of Louisiana, 24 TUL. L. REV. 419 (1950). However, the Code of 1870 con-
tained article 915, which gave the spouse greater rights to the deceased's community
property. The spouse retained a usufruct over the deceased's community property not
testamentarily disposed of if no ascendants or descendants survived. The spouse's
rights under article 915 were enhanced in 1910 to the point that the spouse took the
property in full ownership in default of ascendants or descendants. In 1916 the spouse
was raised to a level equal to the parents under 915 and was excluded only by descen-
dants. Other changes have been made, resulting in the present code article. Little has
been done as yet in terms of granting the spouse rights to the deceased's separate pro-
perty. See note 119, infra.
119. Presently, article 924 of the Code provides that the surviving husband inherits
the separate property of his wife only to the exclusion of unacknowledged illegitimate
children and the state. The wife, under this provision, inherits from her husband to the
exclusion of the state and all illegitimates. This article appears to be unconstitutional
in discriminating against illegitimate children. Apparently after Brown, a surviving
spouse will exclude only the state in a separate property inheritance.
Perhaps the Louisiana Legislature could learn a lesson from the Quebec Civil
Code; under its system, the spouse is given rights equal to, and sometimes greater
than, those accorded descendants. If one descendant survives, half the estate is taken
by the spouse and half by the descendant. However, if the number of descendants is
more than one, the spouse's share remains one-half while the descendants must share
one-half. The spouse also has the right to forego his one-half share and take instead a
usufruct over the whole of the property. If no descendants survive under the Code, the
spouse takes to the exclusion of all other relations. QUEBEC CIV. CODE, Book Three,
arts. 40-41 (Draft 1977).
120. For an excellent treatment of the complex and extremely important issue of
the retroactivity of the Brown decision, see Note, The Problematic Application of Suc-
cession of Brown, 41 LA. L. REV. 1314 (1981). The rights of illegitimates who claim a
place in the estates of persons deceased before the Brown decision was rendered hinge
on the ultimate determination of the retroactivity of Brown.
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